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ABSTRACT 
Jane Larson’s work and life enriched my own and others.  Her intellectual 
framework—applying legal economic ideas of consent to feminist theory, 
backed up by legal history—suggest surprisingly practical solutions to 
problems ranging from the injuries of adultery and prostitution to housing in 
border towns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Coming of age in the 1980s, I cut my feminist teeth on the phrase “the 
personal is political,” then grew up to make a career out of writing about 
families, the most personal of political institutions. Today, I set aside a chapter 
from the book I am calling Love & Contracts to write a few words about how 
Jane Larson’s life and work has informed my teaching and writing about the 
personal and political question of how law should treat the families I call “Plan 
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B”—cohabitants, same-sex couples, and polygamists—as well as the people 
who perform what are still called “housewifely tasks” in all kinds of families. I 
have learned a lot of doctrine and theory from Jane’s work, and our 
conversations at conferences, and about also the value of practicality and 
surprise. 
I might have measured that legacy in law review footnotes that cite Jane’s 
work, conference panels featuring it, dissertations informed by it, and books 
further building on her contributions.1 But this essay rejects the quantitative in 
favor of the qualitative approach, accepting the invitation of festschrift, as a 
genre, to reflect in personal terms on the work and character of a respected 
colleague. Accordingly, in honor of Jane’s dedication to the personal 
implications of political arrangements, as well as the political implications of 
personal arrangements, this piece braids a bit of memoir with legal analysis. It 
starts with the personal, telling a few stories about how Jane, as a person, left 
her mark, and then extends to her professional legacy, charting her ideas’ 
influence on my current book project, Love & Contracts. The essay’s very 
brevity reflects its role as a punctuation mark among the many things that can 
and will be said about the legacy of Jane’s signature blend of practicality and 
surprise in her scholarship. 
I. ONE WILD AND PRECIOUS LIFE 
The poet Mary Oliver famously asks “tell me, what is it you plan to do 
with your one wild and precious life?”2 This big question greets me each 
morning from a little white strip of paper curled around an old mustard jar 
filled with Cape Cod sand that sits over my kitchen sink. While washing dishes 
the night I head that Jane passed away, I thought about her work and her all 
too-short life. What did Jane, an academic, a feminist, a lawyer, a friend and 
colleague to many, a mother, do with her one wild and precious—and short—
life? 
Most of what I know about Jane is from her writing. I had just graduated 
from Northwestern when Jane joined the faculty, so I never sat in her classroom 
taking notes. But once I got into academia, I scribbled plenty of notes in the 
margins of her law review articles about the tort of seduction, age of consent, 
                                                          
 * Hanan & Carole Sibel Research Professor, University of Maryland Carey Law 
School. Thanks to Beth Mertz for organizing this symposium and the University of 
Maryland Law Library for research assistance and support. 
1.  A Westlaw search on January 18, 2013, reported 126 citations to Jane’s article, Jane 
E. Larson, “Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature ‘Deceit’”: A Feminist 
Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374 (1993) [hereinafter “Women Understand So 
Little”]. Scholars dubbed it “provocative” and “radical.” Linda C. McClain, The Liberal 
Future of Relational Feminism: Robin West’s Caring for Justice, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
477, 507 n.33 (1999); Viviana A. Zelizer, The Purchase of Intimacy, 25 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 817, 839 (2000).    
2.  Mary Oliver, The Summer Day, in NEW AND SELECTED POEMS (1992), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/poetry/180/133.html. 
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and Texas colonias,3 and put together an author-meets-reader session on the 
fabulously titled book Hard Bargains at the Law & Society Association Annual 
Meeting. Richard Posner participated in that panel along with feminists Joan 
Williams, Linda Hirshman, and Jane, a mark of how her work bridged 
feminism and legal economics. Like a duckling learning to swim by following 
an older one, I read her work to learn not only the substantive material she 
conveyed with such precision and insight, but also to figure out how I, too, 
might combine feminism with legal economics, track doctrinal progressions to 
the social, political, and economic contexts in which they occur, and ask 
questions about what the legal rules should be now. On the page, and in our 
conversations, I emulated Jane as I found my own scholarly voice, becoming as 
deeply influenced by her selection of scholarly topics as by her determination 
to research and write from the heart with the larger goal of making the world a 
little safer, and a bit more dignified, for all kinds of women and men. 
On a more personal front, I watched with particular interest how she 
managed to match professional life with family life, and plied her with personal 
questions when she presented a paper, all dignity in her pregnancy, at the 
University of Denver, where I used to teach. The birth announcement, as I 
recall, just said “a love supreme,” with Simon’s picture and birthday. Later, 
when he had grown to be a toddler, I ran into Jane at a conference. When I 
asked about Simon, she told me about taking him to Italy for some academic 
gig. I asked how it was to travel and work with a baby around (wondering 
myself how I would do it, when the time came), and Jane reassured me, 
enthusing about how “Italians love babies,” and had picked him up on buses 
and fussed over him wherever they went. I can still see her eye sparkle, and 
hear her generous laugh, as she added that, two weeks after they got home, 
sitting on the kitchen floor, Simon had looked at the cat and said, “ciao, 
meow!” 
I had not seen Jane much, these past years, since I too have become 
someone juggling professional tasks with personal ones of marriage and 
motherhood. But when I do go out of town to present a paper, I think of her 
when I remember to tuck a picture of my son into conference materials, looking 
forward to it fluttering out, as a picture of Simon did back in 2001, when I was 
sitting next to Jane at a commodification conference. “Oh,” she smiled, as if 
telling the story of how the picture got in there magnified the pleasure of 
looking at her son, “I always slip a picture of him in there, as a pleasant 
surprise, while I’m away.” 
Sometimes, Jane’s example was harder to follow. She once told me about 
how annoying law student editors’ changes were, because, she said, “I wouldn’t 
have sent it in if it weren’t done!” Then, as now, I send in things that need 
                                                          
3.  See Jane E. Larson, “Even a Worm Will Turn at Last”: Rape Reform in Late 
Nineteenth-Century America, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1997); “Women Understand So 
Little,” supra note 1; Peter M. Ward, Flavio de Souza, Cecilia Giusti & Jane E. Larson, El 
Titulo En La Mano: The Impact of Titling Programs on Low-Income Housing in Texas 
Colonias, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1 (2011). 
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editing, each time wishing I said it perfectly the first time. When I am facing a 
tsunami of editors’ comments and suggestions, I think of Jane. 
But Jane’s substantive work took a different approach to perfection. When 
she saw a problem that law might address—constrained consent in sexual 
relations, say, or poor immigrants’ slap-dash housing—she proposed solutions 
that balanced practical considerations against abstract ideals of justice and 
equality. It often surprised me, since it contrasted with other feminist and 
critical legal theorists’ focus on idealized conditions. Sitting down to write this 
essay— a break from writing my own book, which also embraces practicality 
over purity—  I realize that Jane’s combination of practicality and surprise has 
influenced my book just as much as her substantive analysis of love and 
bargaining. 
A. The Virtues of Practicality 
Not satisfied to let her law review articles fall into the genre of scholarship 
I sometimes call cranky criticism, Jane’s work documented inequality and the 
state’s response to—or collusion with—that inequality at various times in 
various places, and finished by proposing a fix that might actually work. 
Throughout, her efforts to puzzle out solutions to long-standing issues of 
inequality—of gender, race and class—resisted the temptation of letting the 
perfect become the enemy of the good.4 In a series of articles, she argued for 
the re-invigoration of the tort of seduction and other so-called “heart balm 
legislation,” a sensible approach to age-of-consent laws, and relaxed zoning 
regulations in the Texas colonias.5 Always acknowledging hierarchy and its 
injuries on the bottom half of a dyad (male/female, rich/poor, or 
native/immigrant), she took the chance of proposing real-world solutions that 
were sure to raise hackles across the political spectrum. No wonder Richard 
Posner said of Hard Bargains, “The authors’ outspokenness and radical slant 
will make this a controversial book, but it is not orthodox or doctrinaire, and 
the forcefulness, clarity and skill with which the authors defend their position 
will challenge skeptics.”6 
This combination—charting inequality then proposing solutions to it—
invested Jane’s work with a foundational optimism. Rather than throw up her 
hands at ages of abuse, or propose castles-in-the-air solutions, Jane brought a 
reformer’s passion and practicality to each topic she tackled. As she and her co-
author Linda Hirshman said of their proposal to de-criminalize prostitution in 
Hard Bargains, “[w]e take no position on what the ultimate best policy would 
be, but argue that a first step toward a more just system of law is to take 
prostitution out of the state of nature and into the ordinary world of civil law.”7 
                                                          
4.  A phrase commonly attributed to Voltaire. See VOLTAIRE, LA BÉGUEULE: CONTE 
MORAL (Kissinger Legacy Reprints ed. 2010) (1772).  
5.  See supra note 3. 
6.  LINDA R. HIRSHMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX 
(1998) (Posner’s quotation is located on the book’s dust jacket). 
7.  Id. at 294. 
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B. The Tactical Benefit of Surprise 
Jane Larson’s work was surprising. She was among the first feminists to 
pick up legal economic tools to resolve long-standing problems.8 Instead of 
seeing old doctrinal tools like the tort of seduction, or remedies for adultery at 
divorce as rusty skeleton keys useful only to lock women into domesticity—
and out of the public sphere—she invited us to see long-dormant remnants of 
nineteenth-century Separate Spheres divisions between masculinity and 
femininity as potentially empowering for many women. How resourceful—
even efficient—to refashion a familiar theoretical tool like game theory and use 
it to fix problems of unequal bargaining power between men and women in 
their intimate relations. Another patch of common ground Jane shared with 
legal economics is the benefits of free contracting. Throughout, Jane’s 
scholarship sought to make consent meaningful, seeking to give voice to too-
often silenced women in the law of rape, prostitution, and adultery. 
Regarding rape law, Jane Larson and Linda Hirshman proposed to flip the 
default rule to require proof of consent to evade liability, a 180-degree turn 
from the current rule which requires the state to prove a victim’s non-consent. 
Requiring proof of “an affirmative ‘yes’ as the condition for intimate access 
between adults,” they argued would protect women’s “right to bargain for the 
conditions of sexual access.”9 Their goal was mutuality—genuine consent—
and the means was “forcing the stronger player to bargain with the weaker for 
an explicit consent.”10 
Hard Bargains similarly sought to invest prostitutes with freedom of 
contract. Citing the “widespread police corruption and sexual abuse of 
prostitutes” caused by criminalizing prostitution, they proposed an alternative 
civil regime: “We propose instead to regulate sex commerce through existing 
labor laws, protecting prostitutes as workers and treating pimps and patrons as 
employers. Prostitution would be an illegal labor contract, subject to the civil 
                                                          
8.  Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996); MARGARET BRINIG, 
FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY (2000); 
Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women’s Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 81 (1997). Other pieces that join in Jane and others’ attempts to fashion feminist 
takes legal economics include Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From 
Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1235, 1245 (1998). Other feminists saw the benefits of using legal economic 
tools, but advocated a more cautious approach. See, e.g., Jana Singer, Alimony and 
Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 
GEO. L.J. 2423 (1994); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER (1999). My own work in this 
vein includes: RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW & CULTURE 
(Martha M. Ertman & Joan Williams eds., 2005); Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing 
Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women’s Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, 
77 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1998); Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the 
Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001); Martha M. Ertman, 
What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved Theory of 
Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
9.  HIRSHMAN & LARSON, supra note 6, at 270-71. 
10.  Id. at 271. 
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and administrative penalties already applicable to, for example, child or 
sweatshop labor.”11 Instead of the current regime, which largely penalizes 
sellers of sex, usually poorer and more female than the buyers, Hard Bargains’ 
approach would penalize only the employer and not the worker. Indeed, the 
view of prostitutes as workers instead of morally suspect people underscores 
the power of contract, in both theory and practice, to give economically and 
socially marginalized people a measure of control, dignity, and proper payment 
for their work. In the world of Hard Bargains, prostitution would occupy a 
liminal space, decriminalized but still unlawful, in which “prostitutes could 
demand payment for work performed under an illegal contract, protest harsh 
working conditions, or unionize without suffering legal penalty, even though 
their employment would remain illegal.”12 In 1996, the erotic dancers at San 
Francisco’s Lusty Lady club unionized, demonstrating the ways that this 
proposal could help real-world women to support their families with heads held 
high.13 
Adultery, our third and final example of Hard Bargains’ surprisingly 
practical fixes to the law governing sexual relations between men and women, 
represents a turn to civil law. Of course, adultery was once criminalized, but 
unlike rape and prostitution, the state has gotten out of the business of 
enforcing spousal promises of fidelity. Even in civil divorce cases, most states 
do not recognize the costs of adultery to its victims in the division of property 
at divorce, nor as a freestanding claim for breach of promise. Jane Larson and 
Linda Hirshman would change that. Again, contract provides the lever to 
propel an injury from invisible to compensable. Because, they explain, 
“adultery involves ‘betrayal of a promise of fidelity,’ . . . [w]e propose to 
restore to marriage a non-negotiable duty of sexual exclusivity. . . . If 
concubinage is regulated, as we propose to do, people can choose from a 
graduated series of relational obligations, with marriage as the most 
comprehensive.”14 
Larson and Hirshman detail the injuries that law would ordinarily 
recognize, such as loss to dignity and reputation, emotional and mental distress, 
exposure to sexually transmitted diseases, and deception about a man’s 
relationship to the children of the family. They justify a civil instead of criminal 
penalty because these injuries are to the person and not to society, proposing 
that spouses wronged by adultery can seek either a “‘bonus’ in the division of 
marital property upon divorce or death, or a tort action for money damages 
available either during the ongoing marriage or after divorce.”15 Separated 
couples have put so-called “bad-boy” clauses into reconciliation agreements, 
and celebrities have reputedly put them in prenuptial agreements (prenups).16 
                                                          
11.  Id. at 289. 
12.  Id. at 289. 
13.  LIVE NUDE GIRLS UNITE! (First Run Films 2000).  
14.  HIRSHMAN & LARSON, supra note 6, at 284-85. 
15.  Id. at 285. 
16.  Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones’ prenuptial agreement provides that 
she would get a bonus if he is caught cheating. See For Love or Money, 
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While the courts generally will not enforce even formal, bargained-for fidelity 
agreements, these agreements retain social power within the couple.17 
II. THE NEXT GENERATION OF MARRIAGE-AS-CONTRACT FEMINIST 
SCHOLARSHIP 
We are here to celebrate Jane Larson’s legacy, the inheritance she left us 
as colleagues. While each of us is mortal, the ideas, our life’s work, may 
continue after we are gone. Jane’s ideas about bargaining and intimacy form a 
cornerstone of my own work. My book-in-progress, Love & Contracts, 
combines memoir and legal analysis, just as this essay does, because each genre 
conveys its own truths, emotional or cerebral. Accordingly, we pivot here from 
the personal to the professional, zooming in on how Jane’s analysis informs the 
family law chapters of my book. A brief description of one chapter shows the 
continued vitality of her ideas transplanted into my argument for honoring the 
shopping, cooking, cleaning, carpooling, and helping with homework that keep 
a family operating. 
A. Exchanges in Plan A Families 
My book suggests that we see families come in two forms: Plan A and 
Plan B.  The families I call “Plan A”—married, heterosexual, having kids 
conceived at home—are most common.  “Plan B” comes into play when law, 
luck or biology block access to Plan A, requiring law and society to provide 
rules that govern cohabitation, same-sex relationships adoption, and 
reproductive technologies. 
Both Plan A and Plan B, I argue, are supported by a web of contracts and 
mini-contracts that I call “deals.”  Contracts are legally binding, while deals are 
either too little, too vague, or against public policy, so courts don’t enforce 
them.  Plan B agreements are more obvious in Plan A families’ contracts and 
deals, because Plan B families generally merit legal recognition only when 
people make explicit agreements about cohabitation, reproductive technologies. 
Plan A agreements, in contrast, are harder to see because they are deeply 
embedded in both social norms and family law rules that mask the exchange 
elements of family life. My book argues that family law implicitly honors many 
exchanges that help people build our families—Plan A as well as Plan B—
revealing that the heart of family is connection rather than the particular form 
that connection takes.  Consistent with Jane Larson’s work on agreements 
among intimates, I hope to nudge the law toward honoring the promises 
intimates make to each other, much as it would if they were dealing at arms’ 
length. 
Research from other disciplines helps explain how exchanges help form 
and maintain family connections. Economists  like Gary Becker and  socio-
                                                                                                                                       
CHICAGOTRIBUNE.COM (Aug. 2, 2004), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-08-
02/news/0408030054_1_prenuptial-agreement-eric-benet-halle-berry. 
17.  See Diosdado v. Diosdado, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); In re 
Marriage of Mehren & Dargan, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 522 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
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biologists like E.O. Wilson and Richard Dawkins as well as  feminist 
anthropologist Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, demonstrate the long history of family 
exchanges.18 Indeed, there is evidence that family exchanges helped humans 
become the walking, talking, writing, singing, abstract-thinking, internet-
inventing creatures that we are. If evolutionary  scholarship properly interprets 
prehistoric data, recognizing family exchanges cannot hurt families because 
pair exchanges form the very foundation of all human families. 
According to E.O. Wilson, the first exchange, often called “pair bonding,” 
involved our ape-like forefathers swapping meat from the hunt for our hairy 
foremothers’ foraged roots and sexual exclusivity.19 Alongside other 
exchanges—like females swapping childcare duties—these allowed our 
ancestors to have four times more children. That population explosion gave us 
a huge advantage over other apes by handing natural selection a much bigger 
talent pool from which to cull the smartest, strongest, and most cooperative 
genes to pass on to the next generation.20 If you recoil at the mention of socio-
biology, as Jane Larson did in reviewing Richard Posner’s Sex and Reason,21 
you can skip this material and find adequate support for my central arguments 
in the legal and historical analysis of pair-bond exchanges. But soldiering 
through pays off, because evolutionary biology has itself evolved in recent 
years, and provides compelling arguments that underline, instead of undermine, 
the value of women in families and society more generally. 
This research matters because today, a million years after proto-humans 
began their pair-bond exchanges, most families, and family law, continue to be 
shaped by the pair-bonding exchange.22 Today more wives work outside of the 
home than ever before, and most husbands still have higher wages, so that 
women, on average, contribute only 28% of family income.23 Yet, wives, on 
average, still do around 70% of what courts sometimes call “housewifely tasks” 
like shopping, cooking, cleaning, and making sure kids do their homework and 
                                                          
18.  RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (new ed. 1989); E.O. WILSON, ON HUMAN 
NATURE (new ed. 2004); SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, MOTHERS AND OTHERS: THE 
EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING (2009) [hereinafter MOTHERS AND 
OTHERS]; SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, MOTHER NATURE: A HISTORY OF MOTHERS, INFANTS, AND 
NATURAL SELECTION (1999) [hereinafter MOTHER NATURE]. 
19.  WILSON, supra note 18, at 139. 
20.  See generally MOTHERS AND OTHERS, supra note 18 (discussing “cooperative 
breeding” and its psychological implications in the evolution line from apes to Homo 
Sapiens); MOTHER NATURE, supra note 18 (discussing maternal instincts and their effect in 
shaping the human species). 
21.  Jane E. Larson, The New Home Economics, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 443 (1993).  
22.  Many scholars have written about how family law increasingly acknowledges 
friendship bonds and allomothering exchanges. See, e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with 
Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007); Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47 (2007); Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the 
Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385 (2008). 
23.  See KRISTIN SMITH, CARSEY INSTITUTE, INCREASED RELIANCE ON WIVES AS 
BREADWINNERS DURING THE FIRST YEAR OF THE RECESSION 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.carseyinstitute.unh.edu/publications/IB-Smith-Breadwinners09.pdf. 
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get vaccinations.24 While America’s evolution from a manufacturing economy 
to one where most jobs are in service industries may cause many Plan A 
couples to switch roles, with husbands doing more grocery shopping and wives 
working longer hours, the fact remains that in most families one person focuses 
more on wage labor, and the other more on keeping house.25 If evolutionary 
scholars are right that humans are the most flexible species on earth, it is hardly 
surprising that gender roles are changing. What remains stable, it seems, is a 
pair-bonding exchange, as long as one person contributes more financially and 
the other does more on the home front. 
B. The Law As It Is 
This larger pattern is reflected in family law’s general rule requiring 
spouses to share property that either one earns. The idea is that marriage is like 
a partnership, with one person mainly contributing wages and the other 
focusing on grocery shopping, cooking, cleaning, and making sure Christmas 
cards get sent. The end result is a home and family that they share, and they 
generally split their family assets when they divorce. Since the 1970s, family 
law has made an exception to this property-sharing rule by allowing spouses to 
“contract out” of property-sharing.26 That is entirely consistent with the 
contractual arguments in this book, but family law needs to go further. 
Currently, too many courts apply a double standard that values the 
provider’s contributions more than homemaking. Recognizing the exchanges 
built into the very foundation of Plan A families can help family law do a better 
job of valuing both sides of the pair-bond exchange. Three cases illustrate the 
general rule of property sharing mandated by the marriage-as-partnership 
model as well as family law’s willingness to allow spouses to contract around 
that default rule. They progress from property sharing to prenuptial contracts 
that eliminate property sharing and privilege one half of the pair-bond 
exchange over the other. A fourth and final case picks up another strand of Jane 
Larson’s work, highlighting how law could and should enforce promises of 
fidelity among spouses. 
i. Case #1: General Rule of Property Sharing 
Eunice and Miguel (“Mike”) Flechas divorced after Eunice gave up her 
teaching job to move to Mississippi with Mike and become a full-time 
homemaker taking care of his child.27 If they did not make any agreement about 
how to share their property, family law would divide it. But marrying in the 
                                                          
24.  Amy Tennery, More Women are in the Workforce – So Why are They Still Doing 
So Many Chores?, TIME (June 28, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/06/28/more-women-
are-in-the-workforce-so-why-are-we-still-doing-so-many-chores/. 
25.  LIZA MUNDY, THE RICHER SEX (2012); HANNAH ROSIN, THE END OF MEN: AND 
THE RISE OF WOMEN (2012); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: 
WHY MEN AND CLASS MATTER (2010). 
26.  See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970). 
27.  Flechas v. Flechas, 791 So. 2d 295 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). 
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1950s, with children from prior marriages, they agreed to keep Eunice’s 
property—around $500,000—separated from Mike’s $5 million net worth. But 
their prenup was silent about the $1.6 million Mike earned while they were 
married.  The judge allowed Eunice a share of that money because, the judge 
said, “marriage is considered a partnership . . . although [Eunice’s] 
contributions of domestic services are not made directly to a retirement fund, 
they are nonetheless valid material contributions which indirectly contribute to 
any number of marital assets, thereby making such assets jointly acquired.”28 
Since the prenup exception did not apply to money Mike earned during their 
marriage, the court reverted to the general partnership rule and divided that 
money and the property bought with it. 
ii. Case #2: Exception: Prenuptial Agreements 
Baseball great Barry Bonds managed to keep his $43 million from a 
contract with the San Francisco Giants.29 After Bonds married a Swede named 
Sun months after they met in a Montreal sports bar, the general rule would have 
required him to share under the assumption that they swapped financial support 
for housewifely tasks.  But Bonds used a prenup, signed hours before their 
wedding, to “contract out” of the general rule and his half of the pair-bond 
exchange.  This outcome is entirely consistent with the trend toward honoring 
contracts in family law, but it also ignores half of the pair-bond exchange. This 
chapter raises the question of how family law should treat a couple’s pair-bond 
exchange when the provider contracts out of his half of the agreement. 
iii. Case #3: The Price of Valuing only Half of the Pair-Bond Exchange 
Michael and Hildegarde Borelli’s case underscores the injustice of giving 
providers the power to contract out of their side in the “gift” exchange between 
spouses but denying that power to caregivers.30 Seventy-something 
businessman Michael Borelli took advantage of that double standard to free 
ride on his wife’s labor and sacrifices. When doctors told Michael to move to a 
nursing home, he promised to alter his prenup with Hildegard if she would 
attend to all his needs 24/7.  But he did not, leaving his property instead to a 
daughter from his prior marriage. California courts refused to enforce 
Michael’s promise, essentially holding that Michael could contract out of his 
half of the pair-bond exchange but hers was an unalterable status because “a 
wife is obligated by the marriage contract to provide nursing type care to an ill 
husband.”31 
The cases thus far have shown how family could and should honor both 
halves of the pair-bond exchange between caregivers and financial providers. 
But spouses contract about fidelity as well. Jane Larson’s work on the tort of 
seduction, age of consent rules, and especially the prospect of legally 
                                                          
28.  Id. at 301-02. 
29.  In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 813 (Cal. 2000).   
30.  Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
31.  Id. at 19. 
ERTMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/12/2013  11:02 PM 
2013] THE POLITICS OF PRACTICALITY AND SURPRISE 217 
recognizing the harms of adultery, underline the importance of that recognition, 
both for the people involved and for the expressive function of law. A final 
case, about a reconciliation agreement, shows the profound injustice of law’s 
traditional refusal to recognize fidelity agreements as enforceable contracts. 
iv. Case #4: Unfaithfulness to Fidelity Agreements 
Donna and Michael Diosdado separated after his affair, then used a 
formal, attorney-drafted contract to reconcile.32 They agreed if either one 
cheated, the victim of that infidelity would get an extra $50,000 of marital 
property upon divorce. The California court refused to enforce their 
reconciliation agreement, worrying that it would undermine no-fault divorce to 
let spouses put a price on the damage Miguel’s cheating did to Donna and their 
marriage. Family law can do a better job of valuing both homemaking and 
fidelity, as the final section shows. 
C. The Law As It Should Be 
Taking inspiration from Jane Larson’s concrete proposals for doctrinal 
reform, my book offers solutions to better value both homemaking and 
emotional promises like fidelity. 
i. Three-Step Solution 
Family law already follows the general rule (partnership-based property 
sharing), unless a prenuptial agreement (prenup) triggers the exception of one 
party hoarding most or all property acquired during the marriage. I propose we 
add a third step that would apply when a property-hoarding prenup contracts 
out of the provider’s half of the pair-bond exchange. In that case, courts should 
discard the fiction that homemaking is a pure gift, and calculate the value of 
that spouse’s days, months, and years of cooking, cleaning, carpooling, helping 
with homework, and doing the other work that makes a house a home. While 
some scholars advocate a return to pre-1970s law that limited the right to make 
prenups,33 my approach honors providers like Miguel Flechas, Barry Bonds, 
and Michael Borelli’s freedom to enter prenups to protect their property, but 
also compensates homemaking spouses when property-hoarding prenups would 
otherwise leave them high and dry after they spent years making sure that 
everyone else in the family was clean, fed, and cared for. 
ii. Enforcing Reconciliation Agreements 
Family law should similarly honor the freedom of contract of spouses who 
make formal reconciliation agreements trying to avoid divorce, rather than 
second-guess these couples’ choice. Holding Miguel Diosdado to his promise 
to give up $50,000 of marital property if he cheated again—because that 
                                                          
32.  Diosdado v. Diosdado, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
33.  Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U. 
L. REV. 65 (1999). 
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promise of fidelity induced Donna to take him back—would not re-inject fault 
into no-fault divorce rules as the court feared. Honoring those promises would 
merely hold people to promises that induce others’ actions, just as Jane Larson 
would hold seducers to their promises under the tort of seduction.  Consistent 
with Jane’s assertions that law should recognize harms inflicted by intimates, 
my proposal would honor contractual promises to pay “liquidated damages” 
when it is hard to calculate the damage done by breach of a promise of fidelity. 
When Miguel Diosdado freely agreed to put a money value on the otherwise 
hard-to-calculate damage his cheating caused his wife and his family, he should 
be liable to her for breach just as he would in a business agreement. 
My contractual proposals—honoring both sides of the pair bond exchange 
as well as promises of fidelity—should show consistent with Jane Larson’s 
work, that a robust view of consent can honor the initial promises that got 
people into the family business in the first place. 
CONCLUSION 
Jane Larson left a legacy in letters, planting ideas that continue to sprout 
offshoots in my and others’ scholarly writing. I never failed to be surprised by 
her work, and impressed at its breadth, or heartened by its willingness to 
propose practical solutions to hard problems. Those of us who spend our wild 
and precious professional and personal lives trying to puzzle out ways that law 
might operate better and more equitably will long miss her laugh, her thoughts, 
and her beautiful prose. 
 
